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If *C* is not *D*, *A* is not *B*.

If *A* is not *B*, *E* is *F*.

If *E* is *F*, *G* is *H*.

Therefore if *C* is not *D*, *G* is *H*.

In this connection it may be remarked that while the simple dilemma is not fallacious, it is redundant. Consider the following example:

If he accepts the position at Harvard, they will get married at once; and if he accepts the editorship, they will get married at once.

But either he will accept the position at Harvard or he will accept the editorship.

Therefore they will get married at once.

The minor says more than is necessary. That he will not accept both the position at Harvard and the editorship is irrelevant if true. All that we need to know is that if he does not accept the position at Harvard he will accept the editorship.

I will conclude by quoting, for comparison's sake, an example of the complex destructive dilemma. It is from Jevons, who himself quotes it from Archbishop Whately. It is thus a hoary sinner. Thousands of students have been called upon to look upon it as an exemplar of rationality. "If this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently of Scripture in jest; and if he were good, he would not do so in earnest; but he does it either in jest or earnest; therefore he is either not wise, or not good."

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Les Paralogismes du rationalisme. LOUIS ROUGIER. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1920. Pp. xiv + 540.

This is a very interesting and useful, but a somewhat curious book; interesting and valuable for the information it contains, and somewhat curious for the writer's own philosophy in certain respects, and for what seem to be the motives which lie behind this very solid piece of work.

The purpose of M. Rougier is primarily to examine and expose question-begging intellectualism in every form. The book begins by stating that intellectualism "seems" to-day a lost cause, but that unfortunately this is far from true. The habit of dialectical apologetics still continues. Naïve and traditional ideologies hailing from the French Revolution, or from various chapters in the history of philosophy, put enthusiasm in the place of criticism. The generous

impulses that give life to popular fictions appeal to metaphysics and logic in defense of their uncriticized methods. What are these fictions? To a great extent they are those that constitute the *mystique* of twentieth century democracy.

M. Rougier uses the word "rationalism" in a sense a little unfamiliar, perhaps, to American readers. He means by it, to be sure, the habit of *a priori* and deductive argument, but he means, also, that "ism" that translates its admiration for reason into a doctrine about it, the doctrine namely that found its classical expression in the theory that reason is the specific characteristic of man which differentiates him from other animals. Since reason, not being an accident, was held to be equally characteristic of all men, the dialectical consequences for an idealizing theory of democracy are obvious enough, quite regardless of what the facts may happen to be.

Of course the earlier history of rationalism in this sense of the equal endowment of all men with reason, and consequently with equal goodness, equal competence and equal rights to power, brought extraordinary benefits. "But to-day, rationalism seems to have fulfilled its civilizing mission. Destined, essentially, to be a work of critique and destruction, it had nothing wherewith to reconstruct and found anew. Sowing broadcast in the world the idea of natural equality, of the identity of reason in all men, from which follow equal rights, it has led western civilization to the most conspicuous paradox in history" (pp. 48-49).

Now this is an idea that Americans are pretty sure to resent, bred up, as most of them are, in the "rationalism" here under discussion. But, for the French, democracy has not had the colonial simplicity it has had in America, and which, perhaps, it some time ago ceased to have here. Accordingly, the French may prove the prompter critics of problems that will be ours as much as theirs, and American philosophers must not be caught in the dialectic they, or most of them it is safe to say, imbibed with their first school books of United States history. M. Rougier, to be sure, seems caught in another, and no less naïve, dialectic. He fails to recognize, at least he fails to admit, that these philosophical convictions so at variance with the facts are programmes of action; and he quotes Bentham (I have to render from the French): "Why this zeal to proclaim these rights as unconceded, as inalienable? No one ever found them anywhere. The less they exist, the more noise there is to persuade us they have always existed" (p. 45). Of course! but one need not pause to explain that.

In the body of his work, M. Rougier trails the guilty fallacy of

the ontological argument from one philosopher to another. Here he has done a very laborious and a very useful piece of work. The story is accompanied with complete references to sources, so that his text may be used as a guide to them. I think the whole matter is by no means put so simply as it might be, but simplicity is a virtue that comes, or should come, from long handling of a theme and M. Rougier, I fancy, is giving us the first organization of an immense material.

Perhaps the most interesting section to a majority of American readers will be the one on realism, realism for the most part, indeed, of the older stripe. To be sure the word realism is used in a more comprehensive sense than we are accustomed to. Realism, for M. Rougier, seems to be any affirmation of existence which goes beyond the evidence in hand. In this sense, the most audacious and uncompromising "realists" have been the great idealists. But this use of the word helps the writer to make a very interesting classification and exposé.

M. Rougier protests against what may be a defect inherent in all intellectual method—the conceptual simplification of a subject matter. Philosophy seems, he insists, incorrigibly the victim of the assumption that men of different times, places and conditions think alike and are alike. The old dialectical definition of men still encumbers our analysis. What is obvious, M. Rougier contends, if we only observe mankind candidly, is the infinite variety of mental make-up. He goes so far as to suggest that the principle of inference is not uniform. M. Rougier is both right and wrong. It does not follow that because different men use different premises, they do not all apply the principle of contradiction. But on the other point, M. Rougier may well be right; it is likely to be more important for us to know what peoples' premises are and the will that their arguments defend, than the syllogistic forms they might be put into.

How M. Rougier would correct the extravagances of the *mythe rationaliste* is not altogether clear. Presumably by a consistent empiricism where existence is concerned, and the recognition that logic is a strictly formal technique without, as such, any ontological implications. His estimation of current academic philosophical problems is one that we are, in America, not unfamiliar with: "The problems of metaphysics are not real problems in the sense that the questions raised relate to real data. They are pseudo-problems, resulting most often from erroneous types of explanation. They arise especially when, in order to solve them, we demand explanation of a different type from the one corresponding to the mentality which raises the question" (p. 514). "It is we, indeed, who create

the mystery of the world by peopling it with saving, noble and formidable enigmas . . . Men are more willing to be ignorant than to acknowledge the evidence that there is nothing to discover. We agree that the world shall be a cruel enigma; we revolt at the thought that there is no enigma, and that things, in their indifference to morality, simply are" (pp. 520-21).

There is probably much behind a book like this that French readers naturally understand, but which American readers need to have explained. The writer seems concerned about traditions from the French Revolution, which may lend themselves now perhaps, to the enterprise of another revolution, humanitarian, perhaps, in its phraseology, but contradicting in its effects all that the phraseology proclaims. No doubt men will always aspire to give their dreams the form of logic, but that aspiration is a form of conscience that men should cling to, for without it there could be no will to criticize and clarify.

I should not, however, give the impression that the book is motivated chiefly by this consideration. Professional philosophy shows still so many examples of apologetic sophistry (pp. xi-xiii) that an examination of their technique is abundantly justified.

M. Rougier promises to support many of his claims in a work to be devoted to the history of the real distinction between essence and existence from Aristotle to Suarez, which, to judge by the pages on medieval logic in the present work, should be of exceptional interest.

WENDELL T. BUSH.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

The Problem of the Nervous Child. ELIDA EVANS. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co. 1920. Pp. 299.

This book is written to aid parents and others in the management of "problem" children. The author speaks from the psychoanalytic point of view, making use especially of the concepts originating with the Zürich school of psychoanalytic thought. Such topics as the development of repression, symbolic thought, defense reactions, the parent complex, buried emotions, muscle erotism, the tyrant child, teaching of right and wrong, self and character are treated, quite largely by the method of illustrative cases. This leads, at times, to conspicuous lapses from good literary form, the material apparently being transcribed from case-histories without sufficient revision as to sentence structure.

The educational psychologist who insists on verification, or attempted verification, by laboratory methods, would regard as mystic